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Abstract
We invoke concepts from the theory of hypergraphs to give a measure of the closeness of family resemblance, and to make
precise the idea of a composite likeness. It is shown that for any positive integer m, for any general term possessing any extent of
family resemblance strictly greater than m, there is a taxonomical representation of the term whereby each subordinate taxon has
an extent of family resemblance strictly greater than m.
© 2006 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. The basic idea
The idea of family resemblance was introduced by Wittgenstein [3] as an ingredient of his account of what consti-
tutes possession of a concept, and what is required for the application of a general term. The account is intended to be
more satisfactory than corresponding accounts that rely upon the apprehension of essential properties:
66. . . . Consider for example the proceedings we call games . . . if you look at them you will not see something
that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that . . . look for example at
board games with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences
to the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball games, much
that is common is retained, but much is lost.–Are they all ‘amusing’? Compare chess with naughts and crosses. Or
is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? In ball games there is winning and losing, but
when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared . . .
And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-
crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.
67. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than “family resemblances”; for the
various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc.
overlap and criss-cross in the same way.—And I say ‘games’ form a family. [3]
A family, as Wittgenstein envisaged the notion, can be represented as a collection of collections of properties
or attributes, satisfying unspecified intersection requirements. We may assume that the properties in question are
pairwise-independent, that is, that for pairs of these properties, having the one does not entail having the other. Of
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being a biological item or having a common ancestor would be one such, but this property, even if it is not entailed
by other properties of the collection, does not seem to be part of Wittgenstein’s conception. If Rosch and Mervis have
got it right [2], the problem with such properties is that not that they are shared by every member of the family, but
that they are shared with members of other distinct families to the same extent. And if Wittgenstein had in mind to
explicate what he took to be a common notion, then the research reported in [2] would seem to bear him out. At any
rate, there are good grounds for restricting our attention to families F having the property that all pairs of properties
in
⋃F are independent. Wittgenstein:
But if someone wished to say: “There is something common to all these constructions–namely the disjunction of all
their common properties”—I should reply: Now you are playing with words. One might as well say: “Something
runs through the whole thread–namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres”. [1, para. 67]
Again, one must not try to be more precise than we have been in the general account as to what these intersection
requirements are, since the collection of families is itself a family. One family might be characterized by one inter-
section property, another by another. In what follows, therefore, we cannot claim to do justice to the vagueness of the
general notion: in the nature of the case there could never be grounds for a claim that one had.
In [2], Rosch and Mervis confirm the hypothesis that “members of categories which are considered most proto-
typical are those with most attributes in common with other members of the category and least attributes in common
with other categories” [2]. Accordingly, [2] represents the first empirical documentation of the existence in natural
language categories of such general structural relationships as Wittgenstein posits. They write:
e viewed natural semantic categories as networks of overlapping attributes; the basic hypothesis was that members
of a category come to be viewed as prototypical of the category as a whole in proportion to the extent to which they
bear a family resemblance to (have attributes which overlap those of) other members of the category. [2] (emphasis
ours)
This notion of the extent, or level as we sometimes say, of family resemblance is what this paper is all about.
Wittgenstein’s account suggests, and Rosch and Mervis’s confirms, that there is a logic of categories and general
terms which resists conventional essentialist representation. This raises the question of whether there is an adequate
non-essentialist formal representation. In this article, we propose a model of category structure that is intended to ap-
proximate what Wittgenstein, and Rosch and Mervis, have in mind; it is such that any concept, possessing any extent
of family resemblance above a certain degree can be represented as a taxon, in a hierarchy of concepts, subordinating
only taxa which also possess an extent of family resemblance above this degree. To show this we introduce a deriva-
tional system consisting of a base set of properties together with a collection of rules for generating taxa. Along the
way we show how to define a measure of closeness of family resemblance, and we illustrate the relationship between
family resemblance and the mathematical theory of hypergraphs by making precise the notion of a composite likeness.
2. Its realization
A collection of objects, X forms a family, F , in virtue of some set, P , of properties, such that ∀x ∈ X, ∃P ′ ⊆
P: ∀ϕ ∈ P ′, ϕx. But typically, the application of the term family requires that P be sufficiently small in relation to X,
that q-tuples of objects (0 < q  |X|) of X share properties from P . Hence the informal notion of family resemblance,
the physically apparent harmoniousness of families, drawn, as it were, from a restricted palette of features. Informally,
on this account, a family is represented as a collection of collections of properties that, to some extent, overlap. The
harmoniousness of a family lies in the character of this overlap.
Definition 1. Let P be a set of properties. Then a set F is a family on P if F=∅ ⊆ 2P and ∅ /∈F .1
1 Reference to P is omitted when context is sufficiently disambiguating.
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the indeterminacy of concepts. There are at least two aspects of this indeterminacy; one is that some concepts are
“unbounded”; a second, related, issue involves cases which are not clearly instances of a general term [3]. There
is a difference between a collection with indeterminately many members, and a collection in which membership is
indeterminate. A set, however, is typically construed as being a collection for which both membership and cardinality
are fixed.
Part of this apparent incongruity can be resolved by allowing the set P of properties to be indefinitely large. In this
way the size of a family may be indefinite, and the issue of the boundaries of a concept needn’t for practical purposes
arise. As for the second kind of indeterminacy, apparently pertaining to vagueness, the model we present is intended as
a discrete approximation of a potentially continuous phenomena, as, for example, a binomial distribution can be used
to approximate a normal distribution, and therefore the model shouldn’t be expected to exactly replicate the natural
continuity of general terms.
Now as ‘family resemblance’ refers to a pattern of intersections among the members of a family, there are two
dimensions along which the general notion may be analyzed, and which our account must make salient if it is to be
adequate with the respect to the notion envisaged by Wittgenstein. In addition to the frequency with which an overlap
of attributes between items occurs, one can speak of the thickness of the overlap, or the number of elements of which
the overlap is comprised. This latter quality can be expressed as a generalization of the former, which we measure
using the harmonic number of a family.
Definition 2. If S is a set and q is a positive integer, we write ‘
(
S
q
)
’ for the set of all q-tuple subsets of S. If F is a
family then the harmonic number of F , η(F), is defined:
(2.1)η(F) :=
{
minn ∈ Z+: ∃G ∈ (F
n
)
:
⋂G = ∅ if this limit exists;
∞ otherwise
If η(F) > n then we say that F is n-harmonic.
For example, let
F = {{1,2}, {1,3}, {2,3}}
Then η(F) = 3. This is because every pair of elements of F has a non-empty intersection while there is a triple of
edges, namely, F itself, whose intersection is empty. Another family whose harmonic number is 3 is the following:{{1,2}, {1,3}, {1,4}, {2,3,4}}
Note that if a finite familyF is such that⋂F = ∅, then for some positive integer m where 2m |F |, η(F) = m,
and if
⋂
F = ∅ then η(F) = ∞.
Definition 3. A family F is trivial if ⋂F = ∅.
For example, {{1}} is trivial, as is the family {e ⊆ Z+ | 8 ∈ e}.
Proposition 1. ∀F , [F is not trivial ⇔ ∀x ∈⋃F , ∃e ∈F : e ⊆⋃F − {x}].
Generalizing n-harmonics we have:
Definition 4. If F is a family and n is a positive integer, the n(-harmonic) saturation number of F , σn(F), is defined:
σn(F) := minm 1: ∃k ∈ [n], ∃G ∈
(F
k
)
:
∣∣∣⋂G∣∣∣< m
where for any positive integer n, ‘[n]’ abbreviates ‘{1,2, . . . , n}’. If σn(F) > m then F is m n-(harmonically) satu-
rated.
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be the size of its intersection. Then the n-saturation number of F is 1 larger than the thickness of the thinnest k-tuple
of F for all k ∈ [n]. It can be seen to follow from this informal reading of ‘σn(F)’ that if σn(F) > m  1 then for
each k ∈ [n] (n 1), every k-tuple subset of F is at least m thick. The converse is also true:
Proposition 2. ∀F , n 1, m 1, [σn(F) > m ⇔ ∀k ∈ [n], ∀G ∈
(F
k
)
, |⋂G|m].
For example, consider the following families:
F1 =
{{1,2}, {1,3}, {2,3}}
F2 =
{{1,2,4}, {2,3,5}, {3,4,1}, {4,5,2}, {5,1,3}}
F3 =
{{1,2,3}}
F4 =
{{1,2,3,4}, {1,2,3,5}, {1,2,4,5}, {1,3,4,5}, {2,3,4,5}}
If n = 1 then σn(F1) = 3, σn(F2) = 4 = σn(F3), and σn(F4) = 5. In addition we have σ2(F1) = 2, σ2(F2) = 2,
σ2(F3) = 4, σ2(F4) = 4, σ3(F2) = 1, σ3(F4) = 3, σ4(F1) = 1 = σ5(F4), and σ4(F4) = 2.
Immediate from the definitions of harmonic number and harmonic saturation, the next proposition illustrates the
sense in which m n-saturation is a generalization of n-harmonicity:
Proposition 3. ∀F , n 1, [η(F) > n ⇔ σn(F) > 1].
The following theorem asserts that if F is a non-trivial n-harmonic family, F is m n-saturated only if, for all
k ∈ [n], the thickness of k-tuples of F increases as k decreases.
Theorem 4. ∀F , n 1, m 1, [ifF is not trivial then [σn(F) > m ⇒ ∀i, ∀G ∈
( F
n−i
)
, |⋂G| i+1 (0 i  n−1)]].
Proof. Assume thatF is not trivial and that σn(F) > m 1. Let i be arbitrary (0 i  n−1). Suppose that G ∈
( F
n−i
)
is such that |⋂G| < i + 1. Let ⋂G = {x1, x2, . . . , xh}(h i). Let J = {⋃F − {xm} | m ∈ [h]}. From Proposition 1,
since F is not trivial, ∀e ∈ J , ∃f ∈ F : f ⊆ e. But ⋂(G ∪ J ) = ∅. ∴ ∃g ∈ [(n − i) + h] ∩ [n], ∃H ∈ (F
g
)
such that
G ⊆H and ⋂H= ∅. ∴ η(F ) n, which is absurd, given Proposition 3. 
The notions of harmonic number and harmonic saturation represent two dimensions in terms of which extent of
family resemblance can be analysed. One, corresponding to harmonic number, refers to the frequency with which
attributes are shared among the members of a family; the second, corresponding to harmonic saturation, pertains
to the extent to which attributes are shared, relative to a given frequency. As a result of its dyadic character, there
are some families which are apparently not comparable with respect to family resemblance. Consider the case, for
example, where a family F1 has a lower harmonic number than a family F2 while for some k  1, every k-tuple
subset of F1 is thicker than all, or even most, k-tuple subsets of F2. For example, let
F1 =
{{a1, a2, a3, b1, b2, b3, c1, c2, c3}, {d1, d2, d3, a1, a2, a3, b1, b2, b3},
{d1, d2, d3, a1, a2, a3, c1, c2, c3}, {d1, d2, d3, b1, b2, b3, c1, c2, c3}
}
F2 =
{{1,2,3,4}, {1,2,3,5}, {1,3,4,5}, {2,3,4,5}, {1,2,4,5}}
Then η(F1) = 4 and σ3(F1) > 3, and η(F2) = 5, while σ3(F2) = 3. Because of the inherent vagueness of ‘family
resemblance’ it would seem that prima facie we have no grounds for saying of either family that it possesses a greater
(lesser) degree of family resemblance than the other, nor that their respective levels of family resemblance are equal.
Such considerations suggest that if we are to measure family resemblance, then our gauge should be relativized to a
given frequency. Accordingly we propose:
Definition 5. For a family F and positive integer n, the n-resemblance of F is σn(F).
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Proof. Suppose that σn(F) > |⋃F | + 1. Then ∀k ∈ [n], every k-tuple of F is at least |⋃F | + 1 thick, which is
absurd. Now suppose that F is not trivial, and let σn(F) > |⋃F |. Then ∀k ∈ [n], every k-tuple subset of F is at least
|⋃F | thick. But this can be so only if |F | = 1, in which case F is trivial, contrary to supposition. 
Using harmonic saturation we can define a relation of closeness of family resemblance:
Definition 6. A family F more closely n-resembles G1 than G2 if σn(F ∪ G1) > σn(F ∪ G2).
Thus, for example, where
F = {{5,3,4}, {6,3,4}}
G1 =
{{6,5,1,2,3}, {6,5,1,2,4}, {1,3,4}, {2,3,4}}
G2 =
{{1,2,3}, {1,2,4}, {1,3,4}, {2,3,4}}
F more closely 3-resembles G1 than G2 because σ3(F ∪ G1) = 2 and σ3(F ∪ G2) = 1. Also, F more closely
2-resembles G1 than G2 since σ2(F ∪ G1) = 3 and σ2(F ∪ G2) = 2. However, F does not more closely 1-resemble G1
than G2 since σ1(F ∪ G1) = σ1(F ∪ G2) = 4.
Alternatively, we can define a measure for the similarity of families with respect to family resemblance:
Definition 7. Let F1 and F2 be families. Then F1 d-n-resembles F2 ⇔ σn(F1 ∪F2) σn(F1)−d (0 d  σn(F1)).
For instance, let
F1 =
{{1,2,3,4}, {1,2,3,5}, {1,2,4,5}, {1,3,4,5}, {2,3,4,5}}
F2 =
{{1,2,3}, {1,2,4}, {1,3,4}, {2,3,4}}
Then σ3(F1) = 3, σ3(F2) = 2, and σ3(F1 ∪ F2) = 2. Therefore the least value of d such that F1 d-3-resembles F2
is 1. In general, the higher the least value of d is, the greater the degree with which F2 attenuates the n-resemblance
of F1 when the two families are juxtaposed. To take another example, let
F1 =
{{1,2,3,4}}
F2 =
{{4,5,6}, {1,4,5}, {1,6}}
Then 4 is the least value of d such that F1 d-3-resembles F2 because σ3(F1 ∪ F2) = 1 and σ3(F1) = 5, while F2
0-3-resembles F1 because σ3(F2) = 1.
The preceding example shows that d − n-resemblance is not symmetrical. If d − n-resemblance were taken to
model exactly our conversational understanding of ‘resemblance’ this result is surprising. But no mathematical theory
of any interest is as particular as the instances that motivate it. There is no such theory, for even if no such cases ever
arose in conversational uses this would demonstrate only that conversational features were of particular instances of
the general case. Much as the absence of the so-called paradoxical inferences from conversational uses of if. . . then. . .
does not of itself demonstrate that the conditional cannot be modelled by the material ⊃. In any case, non-symmetry
does constrain conversational uses. It is an historical non-symmetry in the structure of the verb (re-semble) itself. In
general, the observance of non-symmetry serves conversationally to mark the distinction between originals and their
(sometimes later) simulacra. Compare
1. He looks like his father.
2. *His father looks like him.
1. He resembles Napoleon.
2. *Napoleon resembles him.
Proposition 6. ∀F1,F2, n 1, F1 0-n-resembles F2 ⇔ σn(F1 ∪F2) = σn(F1).
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In literature, the term composite is applied to fictional characters who comprise traits of numerous source figures.
In our account of family resemblance we apply the term to what could be regarded as the formal counterpart of such a
fictional character. The idea of a composite, mathematically realized, is the lynch pin connecting the study of families
as conceived by Wittgenstein and empirically studied by Rosch and Mervis to the well-established mathematical
theory of hypergraphs. In fact, save that for local purposes we understand P as a set of properties, the language of
families in our account could yield its place to the language of hypergraphs, and the harmonics of families could be
understood abstractly as defining hitherto unstudied properties of hypergraphs. In fact, the fundamental features that
ground the idea of a family are dual to the characteristics that define one of the principal mathematical interests in
hypergraphs: the properties relating to chromaticity.
Definition 8. A set c is a composite of a family F iff ∀e ∈ F , c ∩ e = ∅; c is a minimal composite of F iff c is a
composite of F and no proper subset of c is a composite of F . The composite family C(F) of F , which may be
written ‘CF ’, is the set of all minimal composites of F .
Proposition 7. ∀F , [CC(F) ⊆F ], and [∀e ∈F , ∃f ∈ CC(F): e ⊇ f ].
Definition 9. If F is a family and m is a positive integer, a function f :⋃F → [m] is an m-colouring of F if
∀e ∈F , k ∈ [m], e  {x ∈⋃F | f (x) = k}. If there is an m-colouring of F then we say that F is m-colourable; F is
m-uncolourable, else. The chromatic number of F , χ(F), is defined:
(3.1)χ(F) :=
{
minm ∈ Z+: F is m-colourable if this limit exists;
∞ otherwise
The chromatic number of a family can also be defined in terms of the set of decompositions of its union.
Definition 10. Let S be a set and m a positive integer. The set of m-decompositions of S, m(S), is defined:
m(S) :=
{
δ = {d1, . . . , dm}
∣∣∣ m⋃
i=1
di = S
}
Proposition 8. ∀F , ∀m 1, [χ(F) > m ⇔ ∀δ ∈ m(⋃F), ∃d ∈ δ, e ∈F : e ⊆ d].
Definition 11. Let F be a family and S a subset of ⋃F . The restriction of F to S, F [S], is the family defined:
F [S] := {e ∈F | e ⊆ S}
Theorem 9. ∀F , n 1, m 1, [σn(F) > m ⇔ . ∀S, |S| < m ⇒ χ((C(F)[⋃F − S])) > n].
Proof. Let F be an arbitrary family, and let m and n be arbitrary positive integers.
(⇒) Let S ⊆⋃F be such that |S| < m and C(F)[⋃F − S] is n-colourable. Then ∃δ ∈ n(⋃F − S) such that
∀e ∈ C(F), ∀d ∈ δ, e  d (Proposition 8). Let G = {⋃F − d | d ∈ δ}. Then ∀g ∈ G, g is a composite of C(F), and⋂G = S. Therefore ∃k ∈ [n], ∃J ∈ (CC(F)
k
)
: ∩J ⊆ S. But CC(F) ⊆F (Proposition 7). Therefore σn(F)m.
(⇐) Let σn(F) = k  m. Then ∃j ∈ [n], ∃G ∈
(F
j
)
: |⋂G| < k  m. Let δ = {⋃F − g | g ∈ G}. Then
δ ∈ j(⋃F −⋂G). But ∀e ∈ C(F)[⋃F −⋂G], ∀d ∈ δ, e  d (Proposition 7). Therefore C(F)[⋃F −⋂G]
is n-colourable (Proposition 8). But |⋂G| < m. Therefore ∃S ⊆⋃F : |S| < m and χ(C(F)[⋃F − S]) n. 
For the case m = 1, what Theorem 9 amounts to in the presence of Proposition 3 is the assertion that n-harmonicity
in a family is equivalent to the n-uncolourability of its composite family. If m  1 then Theorem 9 asserts that the
n-uncolourability of a composite family is preserved under the deletion of fewer than m elements from
⋃F if F is
m n-harmonically saturated.
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Rosch and Mervis documented the cognitive significance of distinct families within more generic groupings of
items [2]. As an example, the family of ‘pets’ lies within, or is subordinated by, the more general category of ‘domestic
animals’, a category which also comprises families of otherwise subordinated non-human creatures. Similarly, the
concepts ‘dog’, ‘cat’, ‘rabbit’ are members of the superordinating category ‘pets’.
For Rosch and Mervis, as for Wittgenstein, what accounts for the subordination of a concept within a more general
category is not that there is some single criterion possessed by all and only members of the category, but rather
that there is a network of shared attributes, or intersections. This network is the family resemblance of the category,
whose extent we have represented using the concept of the n-resemblance of a family F , which refers to σn(F), the
n-saturation number of F .
Now granted that subordinate categories inherit the extent of family resemblance of superordinating ones, is it true
that for every category, with any level of family resemblance, there is a taxonomic representation which preserves this
fact? Below, we show one way that a subordination relation can be structured so that this is answered affirmatively.
Definition 12. A taxon is a taxonomic group of any rank, including all the subordinate groups; it is any group of
organisms or populations considered to be sufficiently distinct from other such groups to be treated as a separate unit.
The (taxonomic) rank of a taxon is its position in a hierarchy of classification [1].
To formalize what is meant by the rank of a taxon, we employ the notion of an m-n-derivation. Intuitively, this
can be understood analogously to a proof in a logical system, substituting hypergraph and set-theoretic operations
for rules of inference. Essentially we take iterations of these operations to structure the subordination relation among
taxa. The system as a whole will be shown to be sound and complete with respect to n-resemblance strictly greater
than m 1.
Definition 13. Let F and G be families. If every element of F is a superset of an element of G, then F subsumes G,
written ‘F  G’, or ‘G F ’.
Proposition 10. ∀m 1, n 1, ∀F ,G, [if σn(F) > m and G F then σn(G) > m].
Given our intention to devise a system which is sound with respect to n-resemblance, Proposition 10 licenses the
following rule ‘upward subsumption’:
(4.1)[↑]: given F , if G F , obtain G
Definition 14. Let S =F1,F2, . . . ,Fi , . . . ,Fq be a sequence of q families (1 < q), and let T be a set. Then if n 1,
T n-covers S if ∃{F1, . . . ,Fn} ∈
(
S
n
)
such that ∀i ∈ [n], ∃e ∈Fi : T ⊇ e; T minimally n-covers S if T n-covers S, and
no proper subset of T n-covers S. We write ‘ n
q
(F1,F2, . . . ,Fq)’ for the set of all minimal n-covers of S.
Theorem 11. ∀m  1, n  1, for any sequence G1, . . . ,Gn+1 of families, if for each i ∈ [n + 1], σn(Gi ) > m, then
σn(
n
n+1 (G1, . . . ,Gn+1)) > m.
Proof. Let σn( nn+1 (G1, . . . ,Gn+1)) = k  m. Then ∃j ∈ [n], F ∈
( n
n+1 (G1,...,Gn+1)
j
)
: |⋂F | < m. By definition, each
e ∈ F is a superset of an element from every member of some n-tuple subset of G1, . . . ,Gn+1. By a pigeonhole
argument, ∃i ∈ [n+ 1] such that ∀e ∈F , ∃f ∈ Gi : e ⊇ f . So if σn(Gi ) > m then |⋂F |m: a contradiction. Whence
∃i ∈ [n+ 1], σn(Gi )m. 
Because n
n+1 preserves n-resemblance strictly greater than m 1 (Theorem 11), in addition to rule [↑], we also
therefore have ‘n over n+ 1’:
(4.2)
[
n
n+ 1
]
: Given G1, . . . ,Gn+1, obtain n
n+ 1 (G1, . . . ,Gn+1) (n 1)
584 R.E. Jennings, D.X. Nicholson / Journal of Applied Logic 5 (2007) 577–585Our final rule is intended to license type-raising for m-tuples from a base set P of properties:
(4.3)[m]: From {x1, x2, . . . , xm} ⊆P obtain
{{x1, x2, . . . , xm}} (m 1).
Definition 15. If n 1 and m 1, an m-n-derivation of a family F from a set P is a finite sequence of families on P ,
ending with F , where each family is obtained either from preceding ones by an application of [ n
n+1 ] or [↑], or fromP by an application of [m].
Theorem 12. ∀F , n 1, m 1, there is an m-n-derivation of F ⇒ σn(F) > m.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that [ n
n+1 ] and [↑] preserve n-resemblance strictly greater than m, and that∀x1, x2, . . . , xm ∈ P , σn({{x1, x2, . . . , xm}}) > m. We have already shown the former (Proposition 10 and Theo-
rem 11); the latter follows from the fact that if {x1, . . . , xm} ⊆P , then σn({{x1, . . . , xm}}) = m+ 1. 
Theorem 13. ∀F , n 1, m 1, σn(F) > m ⇒ there is an m-n-derivation of F .
Proof. Let m 1 and n 1 be arbitrary. Let F be an arbitrary family on a set P of properties such that σn(F) > m.
We induce on |F |. For the basis, let |F | n. Then |⋂F |m. Let {x1, . . . , xm} ⊆⋂F . Then F  {{x1, . . . , xm}}.
Therefore there is an m-n-derivation of F from P using [m] and an application of [↑].
Now let |F | n+ 1. Where {e1, . . . , en+1} ⊆F , define:
Fi :=F − {ei} (i ∈ [n+ 1])
Then ∀i ∈ [n + 1], σn(Fi ) > m, by the downward monotonicity of n-resemblance strictly greater than m. The hy-
pothesis of induction therefore allows us to assert that for each i ∈ [n + 1], there is an m-n-derivation of Fi from P .
But ∀e ∈F , e is an n-cover for F1,F2, . . . ,Fn+1. Therefore F  nn+1 (F1,F2, . . . ,Fn+1). Whence, there is an m-n-
derivation of F from P , namely, the sequence consisting of the m-n-derivation of F1, followed by the m-n-derivation
of F2, . . . , followed by the m-n-derivation of Fn+1, followed by an application of nn+1 , and terminated by an applica-
tion of [↑]. 
With the notion of an m-n-derivation in hand, we may now speak of the rank of a taxon.
Definition 16. The rank of a family F , relative to a given m-n-derivation D of a family G, ρD(F), is the position of
F in D.
We also introduce the notion of a proper (m-n-)derivation to distinguish between useful and irrelevant applications
of rules. We shall not have occasion here to provide a comprehensive analysis of relevance with respect to derivations,
and rely on what is, we hope, a shared prima facie intuition with the reader.
Definition 17. An m-n-derivationD= (G1,G2, . . . ,Gi , . . . ,Gq) of a family Gq (q  1) is proper if ∀i ∈ [q],D− (Gi )
is not an m-n-derivation of Gq .
Evidentally, Theorem 13 may be restated in terms of proper derivations. Definition 17 enables us to formalize a
concept of taxonomical subordination.
Definition 18. A family F m-n-subordinates a family G iff there is a proper m-n-derivation of F in which G appears.
Theorem 14. ∀F , m 1, n 1, σn(F) > m ⇒ ∃q  1: there is a representation of F as a taxon of rank q where F
m-n-subordinates only taxa of n-resemblance strictly greater than m.
Proof. Theorem 14 is immediate from the fact that ∀F , if σn(F) > m then there is a proper m-n-derivation D of F
such that ∀G, if G is in D then σn(G) > m (Theorems 12 and 13). 
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